In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege. Overview[edit]. According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists Frege, G. ” On Concept and Object”, originally published as “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand” in. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. Original: “Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand”, in Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie XVI (): –;; In English: “Concept. Download Citation on ResearchGate | Kerry und frege über begriff und gegenstand 1 | After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account.

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MendelsohnInquiry Some commentators maintain that Frege’s only point in bringing up this objection is to show how HP is inadequate as a definition gwgenstand number as described earlier.

Though largely ignored during his lifetime, Giuseppe Peano — and Bertrand Russell — introduced his work to later generations of logicians and philosophers. Verlag Mentis GabrielG. Verlag von Louis Nebert, marked a turning point in the history of logic. But there can be little doubt that he already envisages a definite path along which the ultimate proof of logicism is to proceed.

Crispin Wright’s neologicism, especially as subsequently articulated and criticized by George S. Opere scelte, II Rome: But even granting that second-order logic may count as logic in the requisite sense, further objections apply to HP. Hence, Frege concludes, numbers must be objects. Carnap attended these lectures and took notes.

Gottlob Frege, Über Begriff und Gegenstand – PhilPapers

Boolos and others, caused a veritable renaissance of interest ud Frege’s logical and mathematical work, beginning in the s and continuing to this day. Frege’s goal was to show that mathematics grows out of logicand in so doing, he devised techniques that took him far beyond the Aristotelian syllogistic and Stoic propositional logic that had come down to him in the logical tradition.


Science Logic and Mathematics. Having exhibited this possibility, Frege’s larger purpose was to defend the view that arithmetic is a branch of logic, a view known as logicism: According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists of an expression a proper name or a general term plus the definite article that signifies an Object together with a predicate the copula “is”, plus a general term accompanied by the betriff article or an adjective that signifies bedeutet a Concept.

A logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number Complete translation by J. Clarendon CopiI. Oxford University Press StachelrothJ.

Frege then defines an object a to be a cardinal number if there exists a concept F such that a is the number belonging to F. Referenceor, “Bedeutung” applied to proper gegensfandwhere a given expression say the expression “Tom” simply refers to the entity bearing the name the person named Tom.

Gottlob Frege – – Wittgenstein-Studien 3 2: At this point, he has effectively recovered all the axioms of second-order Peano arithmetic from his definitions, except the one requiring every natural number to have a successor.

Kraal in McGuinness [] pp. Gegenstadn, ; reprinted in Thiel []with Corrigenda six pages and some textual criticism. These may be found in Gabriel et al. The diagrammatic notation that Frege used had no antecedents and has had no imitators since.

Bertrand Russell, just when the printing of this volume was nearing its completion.

In this article, Frege criticizes Hilbert’s understanding and use of the axiomatic method. Written by Professor Dr. Hermann Pohle, ; reprinted in Angelelli [] pp. Rand as “About the Law of Inertia” uund Synthese 13pp. What is more, there are abstraction principles like Boolos’s parity principle that hold only in finite domains, which makes them incompatible with HP, and hence it cannot be the logical form of begenstand abstraction principle alone that could make HP analytic.

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Über Begriff und Gegenstand

Sign in to use this feature. Stoothoff in Geach [] pp. It has been translated by E. Neuenhahn, ; reprinted in Angelelli [] pp.

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it was published or registered with the U. Korselt in Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 12pp. This gegenstanc a brief reply to Cantor, G. Putnam CUP, pp.

English translation in Reck and Awodey pp. While no one has seriously suggested that HP could be regarded as a principle of logic, some argue that it nevertheless enjoys some privileged epistemological status akin to analyticity, the principle being, in some sense, “analytic of ” number. From Frege to Wittgenstein: Olms contains the English version of Frege [] AustinJ. From Frege to Wittgenstein: Jourdain translated Frege’s comments and published them as footnotes to his paper in the The Quarterly Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics.

Frege’s distinction helped hnd clarify the notions of a setof the membership relation between element and set, and of empty and infinite sets. In childhood, Frege encountered philosophies that would begrigf his future scientific career. Schubert’s Numbers,” in CPpp. After his immigration to the United StatesCarnap, with Alonzo Church, was instrumental in keeping Fregean ideas in logic alive in the United States where they came to flourish, for instance, in the work in semantics of David Kaplan and Richard Montague.

Gottlob Frege, Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand,